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SIEGLEIN v. SCHMIDT: SECURING THE LEGITIMACY 
OF ALL CHILDREN CREATED THROUGH ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
GABRIELLE C. PHILLIPS 
Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”) is steadily becoming more 
popular in the United States; in nearly twenty years, the use of ARTs tripled.1  
ARTs are particularly popular in Maryland, where ART use exceeds the na-
tional average.2  ARTs have even made their mark on the American media, 
for example, when the public learned about “Modern Family” star Sofia Ver-
gara’s legal battle with her ex-husband over their frozen embryos.3  Presump-
tively, lawsuits of this sort are becoming more prevalent because ART use is 
increasing, while statutes related to ARTs are limited and outdated.4  Initially, 
these statutes were created to prevent the illegitimacy of children conceived 
through artificial insemination.5  Today, however, there are many ARTs: in 
vitro fertilization (“IVF”), where an egg is “fertiliz[ed] outside of the body”; 
zygote intrafallopian transfer, where an egg fertilized outside of the body is 
placed in the fallopian tube; gamete intrafollopian transfer, where eggs and 
sperm are placed in the fallopian tube, causing fertilization to occur within 
the body; and intracytoplasmic sperm injection, where fertilization occurs 
outside of the body by injecting sperm into the egg.6  Additionally, there are 
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 1.  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY SURVEILLANCE—UNITED STATES, 2013, at 8 (Sonja A. Rasmussen et al. eds., 2015). 
 2.  Id. at 6 (“Maryland . . . exceed[ed] 1.5 times the national rate.”).  
 3.  Jaqueline Hurtado & Michael Martinez, Sofia Vergara Reportedly Sued by Ex-Fiance Over 
Their Frozen Embryos, CNN ENTERTAINMENT (Apr. 21, 2015, 6:42 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/17/entertainment/sofia-vergara-frozen-embryos-lawsuit/. 
 4.  See supra text accompanying note 1 (asserting that ARTs are gaining in popularity); infra 
text accompanying notes 64, 204 (noting the limited nature of ART-related statutes). 
 5.  See infra text accompanying notes 180–188 (discussing the purpose of Maryland’s artifi-
cial insemination statute). 
 6.  Reproductive Health, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/infertility/ (last updated Apr. 14, 2016). 
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artificial insemination7 and gestational surrogacy.8  Nonetheless, some ART 
statutes are written to apply to only one ART—artificial insemination—leav-
ing other ARTs without statutory recognition.9 
In Sieglein v. Schmidt,10 the Court of Appeals of Maryland modernized 
Maryland’s artificial insemination statute by determining that the statute en-
compasses more ARTs than artificial insemination alone.11  This Note’s anal-
ysis of the court’s reasoning comprises three assertions: (1) the court cor-
rectly extended the application of Maryland’s artificial insemination statute; 
(2) the court erred when it identified “artificial insemination” as ambiguous 
due to there being multiple methods of artificial insemination; and (3) the 
court erred when it resolved the ambiguity of “artificial insemination” by in-
terpreting the term as encompassing all ARTs, beyond the different forms of 
artificial insemination.12  The court should have reasoned that the term “arti-
ficial insemination” is ambiguous because giving the term its plain meaning 
would not effectuate the purpose of the artificial insemination statute—to 
minimize the illegitimacy of children.13  Nevertheless, the shortcomings of 
Maryland’s artificial insemination statute cannot be corrected by court hold-
ings; the statute needs to be amended by the General Assembly of Mary-
land.14 
I.  THE CASE 
In April 2008, Laura Schmidt and Stephen Sieglein were married.15  
Prior to the marriage, Sieglein underwent a vasectomy and did not wish to 
have children.16  After the marriage, however, Schmidt wanted a child.17  
                                                          
 7.  For a description of artificial insemination, see infra text accompanying notes 152–155 and 
note 155. 
 8.  For a description of the working parts of gestational surrogacy, see infra notes 139–140. 
 9.  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-5405(3) (2011) (creating a presumption of paternity where a 
child is conceived through artificial insemination); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (2015) (same); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95 (LexisNexis 2015) (same); see also infra text accompanying note 
63 (providing an example of a statute written to apply to only artificial insemination). 
 10.  447 Md. 647, 136 A.3d 751 (2016). 
 11.  See infra text accompanying notes 157–161 (discussing the court’s reasoning and conclu-
sion that Maryland’s artificial insemination statute encompasses all ARTs). 
 12.  See infra Part IV.A (analyzing the court’s reasoning). 
 13.  See infra text accompanying notes 188–189 (noting the purpose of Maryland’s artificial 
insemination statute and the effect of an inclusive interpretation of “artificial insemination”).  
 14.  See infra Part IV.B.2–3 (proposing a new ART statute and comparing the proposed statute 
to the current artificial insemination statute).  
 15.  Sieglein v. Schmidt, 224 Md. App. 222, 228, 120 A.3d 790, 794 (2015), aff’d, 447 Md. 
647, 136 A.3d 751 (2016).  
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id. 
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Schmidt and Sieglein were unable to conceive, so they “sought assisted re-
productive services . . . including . . . in vitro fertilization.”18  Pursuant to 
their participation in assisted reproduction, both Schmidt and Sieglein signed 
a consent form, acknowledging that they “ha[d] been fully advised of the 
purpose, risks and benefits” of the services they were accepting, and that they 
were doing so “free from pressure and coercion.”19  Through IVF, using a 
donated egg and donated sperm, Schmidt and Sieglein conceived a son, who 
was born on March 25, 2012.20  Both Schmidt and Sieglein were listed as 
parents on the child’s birth certificate, and both cared for the child after its 
birth, until one month later when they separated.21  After the separation, 
Schmidt filed a complaint for limited divorce and a petition for child support 
in the Circuit Court for Harford County.22  Sieglein answered, denying pater-
nity of the child, and later motioned for the circuit court to determine whether 
he was a parent under Maryland law, and therefore required to pay child sup-
port.23  The circuit court relied on the Maryland’s Estates and Trusts Article 
Section 1-206(b)—Maryland’s artificial insemination statute—which pre-
scribes that a child born to a married couple due to artificial insemination, 
with the husband’s consent, is the legitimate child of both parties.24  Because 
Schmidt and Sieglein were married in 2008 and Sieglein consented to the 
IVF treatment, the circuit court concluded that Sieglein was the child’s fa-
ther.25  Sieglein appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, argu-
ing that paternity should not have been determined with reference to the Es-
tates and Trusts Article.26  Sieglein insisted that IVF is not encompassed by 
Maryland’s artificial insemination statute, because IVF is distinct from arti-
ficial insemination and was not a practice when the statute was codified.27 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s 
ruling.28  The court noted that the Estates and Trusts Article is dispositive 
                                                          
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 228–29, 120 A.3d at 794. 
 20.  Id. at 229, 120 A.3d at 794–95. 
 21.  Id. at 229–30, 120 A.3d at 795. 
 22.  Id. at 230, 120 A.3d at 795. 
 23.  Id.   
 24.  Id. at 231, 120 A.3d at 795–96; MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (LexisNexis 
2011).  Section 1-206(b) reads, “A child conceived by artificial insemination of a married woman 
with the consent of her husband is the legitimate child of both of them for all purposes.  Consent of 
the husband is presumed.”  EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b).   
 25.  Sieglein, 224 Md. App. at 231, 120 A.3d at 796.  The circuit court granted Schmidt sole 
physical and legal custody of the child, ordered Sieglein to pay child support, and granted the parties 
an absolute divorce.  Id. at 232–33, 120 A.3d at 796–97.  
 26.  Id. at 236–38, 120 A.3d at 798, 800. 
 27.  Id. at 238, 120 A.3d at 800. 
 28.  Id. at 252, 120 A.3d at 808. 
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where a child is born during a marriage.29  Specifically, the artificial insemi-
nation statute of the Estates and Trusts Article governed in this case, because 
the child was born via an ART while Schmidt and Sieglein were married.30  
The court affirmed Sieglein’s parental status because, in addition to the child 
being an issue of his marriage, Sieglein consented to the fertility services 
which resulted in the child’s birth.31  Further, the court concluded that Mary-
land’s artificial insemination statute is meant to encompass all “medically 
assisted” reproduction because, “within the context of marriage, the precise 
physical procedure has no necessary impact on the relationship of the parties 
involved—mother, father, and child.”32  Sieglein appealed the decision to the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, which granted the appeal to determine 
whether the term “artificial insemination” encompasses only artificial insem-
ination, or includes other ARTs.33 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Maryland’s artificial insemination statute reflects the common law pre-
sumption of paternity.34  The following discussion traces the progression 
from the common law presumption, to the codification of artificial insemina-
tion statutes, to the application of artificial insemination statutes to other 
ARTs, and ends with a discussion of uniform laws that address ARTs.  Part 
II.A outlines the relationship between the common law and artificial insemi-
nation.35  Part II.B previews the language of artificial insemination statutes.36  
Part II.C explores the interaction of artificial insemination statutes and other 
ARTs.37  Part II.D explicates the ARTs provisions of the Uniform Parentage 
Act and Uniform Probate Code.38 
A.  Common Law 
The presumption of paternity is deeply rooted in the common law.39  
There was a point, early in English history, when the presumption was nearly 
irrebuttable; “[i]f a husband, not physically incapable, was within the four 
seas of England during the period of gestation, the court would not listen to 
                                                          
 29.  Id. at 239, 120 A.3d at 800. 
 30.  Id. at 243, 120 A.3d at 803. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 242–43, 120 A.3d at 802. 
 33.  Sieglein v. Schmidt, 447 Md. 647, 652, 136 A.3d 751, 754 (2016). 
 34.  Markov v. Markov, 360 Md. 296, 304–05, 758 A.2d 75, 79 (2000). 
 35.  See infra Part II.A. 
 36.  See infra Part II.B. 
 37.  See infra Part II.C. 
 38.  See infra Part II.D. 
 39.  Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989). 
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evidence casting doubt upon his paternity.”40  After the reign of the four seas 
rule came “Lord Mansfield’s Rule,” “a rule, founded in decency, morality, 
and policy that [a mother and father] shall not be permitted to say after mar-
riage, that they have had no connection, and therefore that the offspring is 
spurious.”41  The common law endorsed the presumption of paternity to min-
imize state responsibility for illegitimate children, protect families, and avoid 
limiting children’s rights.42  Today, however, such conclusive rules have been 
rejected and the presumption of paternity is vulnerable to rebuttal by various 
kinds of evidence.43  Nevertheless, the law still disfavors illegitimacy.44 
Historically, a child who was not its mother’s husband’s child was 
deemed illegitimate.45  An illegitimate child was believed to be the product 
of adultery and, therefore, unlawful offspring.46  Typically, adultery is de-
fined as “voluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and a partner 
other than the lawful husband or wife.”47  This definition makes it possible 
to argue that artificial insemination amounts to adultery.48  As the argument 
goes, when a woman engages in extramarital sexual intercourse, she has com-
mitted adultery because extramarital intercourse can yield a child, tainting 
her husband’s familial line with blood that is not his own.49  Thus, all conduct 
altering the husband’s bloodline is adulterous.50  Artificial insemination of a 
wife, achieved using donor sperm, introduces into the family blood that is not 
the husband’s.  Therefore, artificial insemination using donor sperm is adul-
tery and produces an illegitimate child.51 
                                                          
 40.  In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 472 (N.Y. 1930). 
 41.  Serafin v. Serafin, 258 N.W.2d 461, 462 (Mich. 1977) (quoting Goodright v. Moss, 2 
Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777)). 
 42.  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125.  Illegitimate children were often accorded fewer benefits than 
legitimate children.  See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1968) (invalidating a law 
allowing legitimate, but not illegitimate, children to bring an action for the wrongful death of a 
parent).  The Supreme Court, however, has since called for equal treatment of legitimate and ille-
gitimate children.  See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (“[A] State may not invidi-
ously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded chil-
dren generally.”). 
 43.  In re Findlay, 170 N.E. at 473; see also, e.g., Miles v. Stovall, 132 Md. App. 71, 82–83, 
750 A.2d 729, 736 (2000) (holding that the presumption of paternity is rebuttable by genetic testing). 
 44.  See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 63 (providing an example of statute that creates a 
presumption of paternity and, therefore, endorses legitimacy). 
 45.  Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). 
 46.  People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 501 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).   
 47.  Flood v. Flood, 24 Md. App. 395, 396 n.1, 330 A.2d 715, 716–17 n.1 (1975) (citing the 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language). 
 48.  See Orford v. Orford [1921], 58 D.L.R. 251, 258 (Can. Ont. S.C.) (contending that artificial 
insemination is adultery). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 259.  But see Sorensen, 437 P.2d at 501 (“Since the doctor may be a woman, or the 
husband himself may administer the insemination by a syringe, this is patently absurd; to consider 
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Early cases demonstrate a lack of consensus regarding whether artificial 
insemination was adultery.  In Strnad v. Strnad,52 where a wife, with the con-
sent of her husband, was artificially inseminated using donor sperm, the court 
held that the child was legitimate.53  The Strnad court acted on the desire to 
avoid illegitimating children; thus, it compared a child born through artificial 
insemination to “a child born out of wedlock who by law is made legitimate 
upon the marriage of the interested parties.”54  Alternatively, some early 
courts ruled that children born through artificial insemination were illegiti-
mate.55  In the absence of statutes addressing artificial insemination, these 
courts adhered to the common law concept of illegitimacy and were unwill-
ing to alter the statutes that were available to them.56 
B.  Artificial Insemination Statutes 
As the use of artificial insemination gained in popularity, state legisla-
tures began to answer the question of whether a child produced through arti-
ficial insemination is legitimate.57  In 1968, the Governor’s Commission to 
Review and Revise the Testamentary Law of Maryland, convened by Gover-
nor J. Millard Tawes, proposed the introduction of Section 1-206(b)—an ar-
tificial insemination statute—to the testamentary law of Maryland.58  In the 
proposal, the Commission commented, “The Commission feels that this ad-
dition is desirable in view of the increased use of artificial insemination and 
                                                          
it an act of adultery with the donor, who at the time of insemination may be a thousand miles away 
or may even be dead, is equally absurd.”). 
 52.  78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948). 
 53.  Id. at 392. 
 54.  Id.  To protect innocent children from the troubles of illegitimacy, states had statutes that 
legitimized children born to an unwed man and woman who later married.  Dilworth v. Dilworth, 
134 Md. 589, 591, 108 A. 165, 166 (1919); see also, e.g., MD. CODE, PUB. GEN. L. art. XLVI, § 29 
(1888) (“If any man shall have a child or children by any woman whom he shall afterwards marry, 
such child or children, if acknowledged by the man, shall, in virtue of such marriage and acknowl-
edgement, be hereby legitimated . . . .”). 
 55.  See Happel v. Mecklenburger, 427 N.E.2d 974, 979 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (discussing 
Doornbos v. Doornbos, 139 N.E.2d 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954), which held that a child born through 
artificial insemination using donor sperm was illegitimate). 
 56.  See Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).  The Gursky court 
stated:  
Unless there can be read into the statutory enactments of this State, dealing with persons 
born out of wedlock, an intention to modify the settled concept as to the status of a child 
whose father was not married to its mother, it must be presumed that the historical con-
cept of illegitimacy with respect to such a child remains in force and effect. 
Id.  
 57.  See COMM’N TO REVIEW AND REVISE THE TESTAMENTARY LAW OF MD., SECOND 
REPORT OF GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION TO REVIEW AND REVISE THE TESTAMENTARY LAW OF 
MARYLAND 8 (1968) [hereinafter COMM’N, SECOND REPORT] (“The Commission feels that this 
addition is desirable in view of the increased use of artificial insemination . . . .”). 
 58.  Id. 
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the lack of any statute or case law on the subject in Maryland.”59  The statute 
and report explicitly mention artificial insemination, but not other ARTs like 
IVF.60 
Other states’ statutes regarding artificial insemination and legitimacy 
are not uniform in their inclusion of IVF and other ARTs.61  For example, 
Connecticut’s artificial insemination statute provides that, “‘Artificial insem-
ination’ . . . includes, but is not limited to, intrauterine insemination and in 
vitro fertilization . . . .”62  On the other hand, New York’s statute reads, “Any 
child born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination . . . shall 
be deemed the legitimate, birth child of the husband and his wife for all pur-
poses.”63  Like Maryland’s artificial insemination statute, New York’s men-
tions only artificial insemination, which adds a prong to the conundrum of 
ARTs and illegitimacy: whether the mention of only artificial insemination 
in these statutes was made to the exclusion of other ARTs.64 
C.  Artificial Insemination Statutes and Other ARTs 
When ART statutes reference only artificial insemination, courts must 
engage in statutory interpretation to determine whether the statutes apply to 
other ARTs.  Thus, first, this Section presents Maryland’s rules of statutory 
interpretation.65  Second, this Section explicates two cases that demonstrate 
statutory interpretation of artificial insemination statutes.66  Third, this Sec-
                                                          
 59.  Id.  
 60.  See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 61.  See infra text accompanying notes 62–63 (presenting different forms of artificial insemi-
nation statutes).  
 62.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-771a(1) (West 2014).   
 63.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1) (McKinney 2010). 
 64.  Compare EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b), with N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1) (McKinney 2010).  
Maryland and New York are far from alone in having statutes that mention only artificial insemi-
nation.  See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-501(B) (2007); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2015); IDAHO CODE § 39-5405 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2301 (Supp. 
2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 
2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (2015); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 49A-1 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95 
(LexisNexis 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 551 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 
.243, .247 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 
2016).  For an example of the problems caused when other ARTs are not read into artificial insem-
ination statutes, consider Sieglein v. Schmidt, 224 Md. App. 222, 120 A.3d 790 (2015), aff’d, 447 
Md. 647, 136 A.3d 751 (2016).  Had the court not read “artificial insemination” to include IVF, 
Sieglein would have been able to successfully deny paternity of a child whose creation he consented 
to.  See id. at 230, 238, 120 A.3d at 795, 800.   
 65.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 66.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
 824 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:817 
 
tion discusses two cases where courts, without conducting statutory interpre-
tation, assume other ARTs fall within “artificial insemination” and apply ar-
tificial insemination statutes to facts involving other ARTs.67 
1.  Statutory Interpretation in Maryland 
Statutory interpretation is meant “to ascertain and effectuate the real and 
actual intent of the Legislature.”68  The first step to statutory interpretation is 
to determine whether the plain meaning of the statute is susceptible to multi-
ple interpretations and, therefore, ambiguous.69  The meaning of statutory 
language is considered in light of its statutory scheme and legislative “pur-
pose, aim, or policy,” not “in a vacuum.”70  Additionally, statutory interpre-
tation is done with an eye toward avoiding absurdity.71  Absurdity arises if 
the suggested interpretation is “inconsistent with common sense.”72   
When statutory language is unambiguous, statutory interpretation be-
gins and ends with the first step of analyzing the language’s plain meaning.73  
When the language is ambiguous, courts determine its meaning “by looking 
to the statute’s legislative history, case law, statutory purpose, as well as the 
structure of the statute.”74  Courts consider the entire statutory scheme, so 
that no provision is rendered superfluous.75 
2.  Statutory Interpretation of Artificial Insemination Statutes 
When ART statutes do not explicitly mention IVF or other ARTs, some 
jurisdictions hold the statutes do not encompass IVF and some jurisdictions 
hold the statutes do encompass IVF.76  In In re O.G.M.,77 the court considered 
the legislative history of Texas’s artificial insemination statute, which has 
                                                          
 67.  See infra Part II.C.3. 
 68.  Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1, 8, 20 A.3d 801, 806 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 69.  See Anderson v. Council of Unit Owners of the Gables on Tuckerman Condo., 404 Md. 
560, 571–72, 948 A.2d 11, 18–19 (2008) (detailing the steps of statutory interpretation). 
 70.  Gardner, 420 Md. at 9, 20 A.3d at 806. 
 71.  Anderson, 404 Md. at 571–72, 948 A.2d at 18. 
 72.  Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 319, 498 A.2d 1195, 1196 (1985) (citing State v. Inter-
cont’l, Ltd., 302 Md. 132, 137, 436 A.2d 174 (1985); Bailey v. Woel, 302 Md. 38, 43, 485 A.2d 
205 (1984)). 
 73. Anderson, 404 Md. at 572, 948 A.2d at 19. 
 74.  Id. (citing Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 173, 935 A.2d 699, 709 (2007); Dep’t of Health 
& Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 419–20, 918 A.2d 470, 482 (2007); Smack v. Dep’t of 
Health & Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 305, 835 A.2d 1175, 1179; Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 129, 756 A.2d 987, 991–92 (2000)). 
 75.  Anderson, 404 Md. at 572, 948 A.2d at 19. 
 76.  See infra text accompanying notes 77–83.  Compare In re O.G.M., 988 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. 
App. 1999) (holding that artificial insemination does not include IVF), with Yulia C. v. Angelo C., 
32 N.Y.S.3d 860 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) (suggesting that artificial insemination does include IVF). 
 77.  988 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. App. 1999). 
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since been repealed, and the plain meaning of the term “artificial insemina-
tion.”78  The court reasoned that the statute did not encompass IVF, because 
IVF was mentioned in neither the statute nor dictionary definitions of “artifi-
cial insemination.”79  In contrast, in Yulia C. v. Angelo C.,80 the court empha-
sized the legislative purpose of New York’s artificial insemination statute,81 
noting that “the policy goal of protecting the legitimacy of children born to 
married couples via alternative reproductive methods is the ultimate guide-
post for the existing and developing legal framework on the issue.”82  Alt-
hough the court did not state whether or not artificial insemination includes 
IVF, it did conclude that where legitimacy is concerned, the scale tips in favor 
of recognizing all ARTs.83  Generally, when determining whether “artificial 
insemination” includes IVF, courts consult dictionary definitions, and the 
legislative history and purpose of artificial insemination statutes, but rarely 
have courts definitively claimed that “artificial insemination” includes IVF 
and other ARTs.84 
3.  Artificial Insemination Statutes Applied to Other ARTs 
The lack of cases stating that “artificial insemination” includes IVF and 
other ARTs is misleading, because it might cause the reader to believe that 
IVF and other ARTs are not covered by artificial insemination statutes.  More 
jurisdictions apply artificial insemination statutes to cases involving other 
ARTs, without explicitly resolving the interpretive issue of whether “artifi-
cial insemination” encompasses other ARTs.85  For example, in Okoli v. 
Okoli,86 when determining a husband’s responsibility for children produced 
through IVF, a Massachusetts appellate court applied the Massachusetts arti-
ficial insemination statute87 without explicitly stating that “artificial insemi-
nation” encompasses IVF.88  Although the court did not aim to determine 
whether the Massachusetts artificial insemination statute encompasses IVF, 
the court demonstrated that the statute does extend to other ARTs.89   
                                                          
 78.  See In re O.G.M., 988 S.W.2d at 477. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  32 N.Y.S.3d 860 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016). 
 81.  See supra text accompanying note 63 for the New York artificial insemination statute. 
 82.  32 N.Y.S.3d at 862. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  See supra text accompanying notes 76–83. 
 85.  See infra text accompanying notes 86–89, 97–98. 
 86.  963 N.E.2d 730 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). 
 87.  The Massachusetts statute provides, “[a]ny child born to a married woman as a result of 
artificial insemination with the consent of her husband, shall be considered the legitimate child of 
the mother and such husband.”  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 2009). 
 88.  963 N.E.2d at 731, 733. 
 89.  See id. (applying the Massachusetts artificial insemination statute to facts involving IVF). 
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The Okoli court sought to determine whether the consent prong of the 
statute requires “consent to create a child” or “consent to become a parent.”90  
The court presented an alternative phrasing of the statute: “if the spouse of a 
woman who undergoes artificial insemination consents to the procedure, that 
spouse is considered the legitimate parent of a resulting child.”91  Thus, the 
court concluded that consent to create a child is sufficient to bring on the 
responsibilities of parenthood.92  That court recognized that this conclusion 
is rooted not only in law, but also in logic: 
 When engaging in sexual intercourse, a male may have no belief 
at all that his actions will result in the creation of a child, yet in 
cases of unintentional pregnancy the male participant is still held 
responsible for child support.  Artificial insemination or IVF has 
no purpose except to create a child, so the intent of the husband 
that a child will be created strongly supports parental responsibil-
ity.93 
Therefore, the court held that parenthood should follow when a husband con-
sents to the use of an ART, which may yield a child, regardless of what par-
ticular technique is used.94 
Just as the Okoli court recognized consent to create a child as supporting 
parental status, other courts recognized intent as the basis of parenthood.95  In 
In re Marriage of Buzzanca,96 a California appellate court was faced with 
determining the parentage of a child born through gestational surrogacy and 
genetically unrelated to either of its intended parents.97  The court reasoned 
that “[t]he same rule which makes a husband the lawful father of a child born 
because of his consent to artificial insemination should be applied here,” con-
ferring parental status to the child’s intended parents.98  The court explained 
                                                          
 90.  Id. at 733.  Some artificial insemination statutes explicitly require consent to become a 
parent.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1) (2001) (“A person who consents to the artificial insem-
ination of a woman . . . with the intent to be the parent of her child, is conclusively established as a 
parent of the resulting child.” (emphasis added)). 
 91.  Okoli, 963 N.E.2d at 734 (quoting T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1253 (Mass. 2004)). 
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id. at 735 n.8 (citation omitted) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 1 (West 2009) 
(“Every person is responsible for the support of his child born out of wedlock . . . .”)).  
 94.  Id. at 735. 
 95.  See Laura WW. v. Peter WW., 856 N.Y.S.2d 258, 262 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (“[E]quity 
and reason require a finding that an individual who participated in and consented to a procedure 
intentionally designed to bring a child into the world can be deemed the legal parent of the resulting 
child.”); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (“[A]lthough . . . both genetic consan-
guinity and giving birth [are] means of establishing a mother and child relationship, when the two 
means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child . . . is the natural 
mother . . . .”). 
 96.  72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
 97.  Id. at 282. 
 98.  Id.   
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that the same rule should apply to both procreation through artificial insemi-
nation and procreation through gestational surrogacy because both involve 
the creation of a child through an ART, “initiated and consented to by in-
tended parents.”99  The court noted that artificial insemination and gestational 
surrogacy are distinguishable only because, when intended parents use ges-
tational surrogacy, “there is no reason to distinguish between [them],” which 
is not the case when intended parents use artificial insemination.100  Where 
gestational surrogacy involves a donor egg and donor sperm, both intended 
parents are completely unrelated to the child, whereas when artificial insem-
ination involves a donor egg and donor sperm, the intended mother is con-
nected to the child through gestation.  Although there might be a difference 
between artificial insemination and gestational surrogacy, the Buzzanca court 
found the two ARTs similar enough to warrant application of the artificial 
insemination statute to both techniques.101  Thus, as demonstrated by Okoli 
and In re Marriage of Buzzanca, there is a practice of applying artificial in-
semination statutes to ARTs other than artificial insemination.102 
Prior to Sieglein v. Schmidt, there was no indication that Maryland law 
allowed for the application of its artificial insemination statute to ARTs other 
than artificial insemination.  Those seeking to establish parental status over 
children of other ARTs relied on other Maryland legitimacy statutes, such as 
the paternity statute.103  Maryland’s paternity statute allows for legitimation 
through a rebuttable presumption,104 an affidavit of parentage,105 and genetic 
testing.106  In addition to the paternity statute, Estates and Trusts Article Sec-
tion 1-208 allows for the establishment of paternity through adjudication, ac-
                                                          
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id.   
 101.  Id. 
 102.  See supra text accompanying notes 86–101. 
 103.  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-1001 to 1048 (LexisNexis 2012); see Conover v. 
Conover, 450 Md. 51, 56, 146 A.3d 433, 435 (2016) (“[The non-biological parent of a child born 
through artificial insemination] asserted that she had standing because she met the paternity factors 
for a ‘father’ set forth in [Section 1-208].”); Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 112–13, 607 A.2d 
935, 938 (1992) (asserting that courts should apply Estates and Trusts Article Section 1-208 when 
determining the parental status of an individual who is not a presumptive parent). 
 104.  FAM. LAW § 5-1027(c)(1) (“There is a rebuttable presumption that the child is the legiti-
mate child of the man to whom its mother was married at the time of conception.”).  A similar 
presumption is contained in the Estates and Trusts Article.  EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(a) (LexisNexis 
2011) (“A child born or conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of both 
spouses.”).   
 105.  FAM. LAW § 5-1028(d)(1) (“An executed affidavit of parentage constitutes a legal finding 
of paternity, subject of any signatory to rescind the affidavit . . . .”).   
 106.  Id. § 5-1029(f)(4) (“A laboratory report [of a blood or genetic test] received into evidence 
establishing a statistical probability of the alleged father’s paternity of at least 99.0% constitutes a 
rebuttable presumption of his paternity.”).   
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knowledging a child as one’s own, treating a child as one’s own, and mar-
riage to the child’s mother after its birth.107  Although Maryland laws regard-
ing the establishment of parental status refer only to paternity, the laws also 
apply to maternity.108  In In re Roberto d.B.,109 the Court of Appeals of Mar-
yland held that, “[b]ecause Maryland’s [Equal Rights Amendment] forbids 
the granting of more rights to one sex than to the other, in order to avoid an 
equal rights challenge, the paternity statutes in Maryland must be construed 
to apply equally to both males and females.”110  Given all the working parts 
of Maryland law relating to parentage and ARTs, Maryland law on this sub-
ject is best described as fragmented, requiring one to look to multiple articles 
when resolving a single inquiry. 
D.  Uniform Parentage Act and Uniform Probate Code 
The Uniform Parentage Act111 (“UPA”) and the Uniform Probate 
Code112 (“UPC”) are much more thorough in their protection of children re-
sulting from ARTs than the typical artificial insemination statute.113  The 
UPC applies to all ARTs, which it broadly defines as “a method of causing 
pregnancy other than sexual intercourse,” and thereby embraces more sce-
narios than just the artificial insemination of a wife with her husband’s con-
sent.114  Similarly, the UPA encompasses all ARTs and applies to more than 
the case of a married couple procreating through artificial insemination.115  
Yet, the UPA and UPC differ in that the UPC uses the term “individual” in 
                                                          
 107.  EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208(b).  Section 1-208 provides:  
A child born to parents who have not participated in a marriage ceremony with each other 
shall be considered to be the child of his father only if the father:  
(1) Has been judicially determined to be the father . . . ;  
(2) Has acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father;  
(3) Has openly and notoriously recognized the child to be his child; or  
(4) Has subsequently married the mother and has acknowledged himself, orally or in 
writing, to be the father. 
Id.  
 108.  In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 283, 923 A.2d 115, 124 (2007). 
 109.  399 Md. 267, 923 A.2d 115. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2002). 
 112.  UNIF. PROB. CODE (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010). 
 113.  In UPC terms, a child resulting from an ART is a “child of assisted reproduction.”  Id. § 2-
120(a)(2) (“‘Child of assisted reproduction’ means a child conceived by means of assisted repro-
duction by a woman other than a gestational carrier . . . .”).   
 114.  Id. § 2-115(2).  This definition is taken from the UPA.  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 
102(4).   
 115.  Id..  Specifically, the UPA encompasses: “(A) intrauterine insemination; (B) donation of 
eggs; (C) donation of embryos; (D) in-vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; and (E) intracyto-
plasmic sperm injection.”  Id. 
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its provisions, whereas the UPA is written in terms of “man” and “woman.”116  
Thus, unlike traditional artificial insemination statutes and the UPA, portions 
of the UPC could apply to same-sex and unmarried couples.117  Despite this 
distinction, the UPC and UPA provisions are very similar.118  Because the 
language of the UPC is more inclusive than that of the UPA, this Note’s sum-
mary of the UPC and UPA provisions quotes the UPC.  And because both 
the UPC and UPA address gestational surrogacy independently of other 
ARTs, this Section first describes the parent-child relationships of children 
of ARTs119 and, second, the parent-child relationships of children of gesta-
tional surrogacy.120 
1.  The Parent-Child Relationship 
Both the UPC and UPA provide rules for determining the parentage of 
children of ARTs.  In summary, the UPC and UPA both prescribe: 
(1) There is no parent-child relationship between a third-party donor and 
a child of ART.121   
                                                          
 116.  See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(e) (using the word “individual”); UNIF. PARENTAGE 
ACT § 703 (using the words “man” and “woman”). 
 117.  Compare UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(f) (“[A] parent-child relationship exists between a 
child of assisted reproduction and an individual . . . who consented to assisted reproduction . . . .”), 
with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (“A man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted repro-
duction by a woman . . . is a parent of the resulting child.”), and MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS 
§ 1-206(b) (LexisNexis 2011) (“A child conceived by artificial insemination of a married woman 
with the consent of her husband is the legitimate child of both of them for all purposes.”).  Under 
the UPC (and depending on state law), an individual can be the parent of a child of ART regardless 
of whether that person is the husband of the birth mother.  See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120 cmt. (e) 
(stating that a presumption of parentage due to being named on a birth certificate can apply to any 
individual).  Therefore, a same-sex spouse, or opposite- or same-sex, non-spousal partner of the 
birth mother may be the other parent of a child of ART.  See id.  But see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 
202, 301 (demonstrating that the UPA does allow unmarried persons to be co-parents, but not people 
of the same sex). 
 118.  For example, neither the UPC nor the UPA allow for disparate treatment of children based 
on their parents’ marital status.  See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-117 (“[A] parent-child relationship exists 
between a child and the child’s genetic parents, regardless of the parents’ marital status.”); UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT § 202 (“A child born to parents who are not married to each other has the same 
rights under the law as a child born to parents who are married to each other.”).  
 119.  See infra Part II.D.1. 
 120.  See infra Part II.D.2. 
 121.  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(b); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702.  “‘Third-party donor’ means 
an individual who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted reproduction, whether or not for con-
sideration.”  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(a)(3).  The UPC excludes from the scope of this term a 
husband or wife who provides genetic material to be used by the wife, a birth mother, an individual 
who signs the child’s birth certificate, or an individual who otherwise consents to parent.  Id. §§ 2-
120(a)(3)(A)–(C), 120(e)–(f); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(8) (providing the same defi-
nition under the term “donor”).  For a list of the ways to establish consent, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 130–133. 
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(2) There is a parent-child relationship between a child of ART and its 
birth mother.122 
(3) There is a parent-child relationship between a child of ART and its 
birth mother’s husband if the mother was inseminated with the husband’s 
sperm during his lifetime.123  If the married couple divorces, or the husband 
revokes his consent to artificial reproduction “before [the] placement of eggs, 
sperm, or embryos,” the husband is not the child’s parent, unless he con-
sented to parent in the event that “assisted reproduction were to occur after 
divorce,” or otherwise consents to parent under such circumstances.124   
(4) There is a parent-child relationship between a child of ART and a 
person listed on the child’s birth certificate.125 
(5) There is a parent-child relationship “between a child of [ART] and 
an individual other than the birth mother who consented to assisted reproduc-
tion by the birth mother with the intent to be treated as the other parent of the 
child.”126  If such consent was provided by the birth mother’s spouse and the 
“married couple is divorced before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, a 
child resulting from the assisted reproduction is not a child of the birth 
mother’s former spouse, unless the former spouse [agreed to be the child’s 
parent under such circumstances].”127  Further, if an individual revokes con-
sent “before [the] placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos,” that person may 
still be the child of ART’s parent if they otherwise consent to being the 
child’s parent.128 
                                                          
 122.  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(c); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(1).  “‘Birth mother’ means 
a woman, other than a gestational carrier . . . , who gives birth to a child of assisted reproduction.  
The term is not limited to a woman who is the child’s genetic mother.”  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-
120(a)(1). 
 123.  Id. § 2-120(d); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705(b)(1) (recognizing a presumption of 
paternity where a husband “provide[s] sperm for . . .  assisted reproduction by his wife”). 
 124.  See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(i)–(j) (explaining the effect of “[d]ivorce [and withdrawal 
of consent] before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos” on parentage); see also UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT § 706 (explaining the “effect of dissolution of marriage or withdrawal of consent” 
on parentage).  For a list of the ways to establish consent, see supra text accompanying notes 130–
133. 
 125.  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(e); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(4)(B). 
 126.  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(f); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703. 
 127.  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(i); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706(a). 
 128.  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(j).  But see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706(b) (declaring that 
“[a]n individual who withdraws consent . . . is not a parent of the resulting child”).  Still, under the 
UPA, it is possible that one who withdraws consent may subsequently establish a parent-child rela-
tionship by adjudication, adoption, or acknowledgement of paternity.  Id. § 201(a)(2)–(3), (b)(2)–
(4).  Additionally, if the individual who withdrew consent is a man who created a child with a 
woman, there may still be “a finding of paternity if the woman and the man, during the first two 
years of the child’s life resided together in the same household with the child and openly held out 
the child as their own.”  Id. § 704(b); see also id. § 204(a)(5) (creating a presumption of paternity 
under the same circumstances without specifying that the man created a child with a woman). 
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Finally, an individual other than the child of ART’s birth mother can be 
the child’s parent only if there is “proof that the individual consented to as-
sisted reproduction by the birth mother with intent to be treated as the other 
parent of the child.”129  Consent with intent to parent a child of ART may be 
established by: (a) writing, executed “before or after the child’s birth”130; (b) 
“function[ing] as a parent of the child no later than two years after the child’s 
birth”131; (c) intending to do so although such function was “prevented . . . by 
death, incapacity, or other circumstances”132; or (d) “inten[t] to be treated as 
a parent of a posthumously conceived child . . . .”133  UPC Section 2-120 cre-
ates a rebuttable presumption that a birth mother’s spouse satisfies (b) or (c), 
and is therefore the other parent of her child of ART, provided “no divorce 
proceeding is pending.”134  There is also a rebuttable presumption that the 
birth mother’s deceased spouse satisfies (c) or (d), provided “no divorce pro-
ceeding was pending” when the spouse died.135 
                                                          
 129.  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120 cmt. subsection (f).  Consent is required regardless of whether 
the prospective parent provided genetic material to create the child because, generally, “merely de-
positing genetic material is not, by itself, sufficient to establish a parent-child relationship with the 
child.”  Id.  
 130.  Id. § 2-120(f)(1).  But see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(a) (requiring that consent “be in 
a record signed by the woman and the man”).  The writing needs to demonstrate “consent consid-
ering all the facts and circumstances,” but “need not explicitly express consent to the procedure with 
intent to be treated as the other parent of [the] child.”  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120 cmt. subsection 
(f)(1). 
 131.  Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(A); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 204(a)(5), 704(b) (providing for 
paternity where a man lives with a child and acts as though he is the child’s parent).  Functioning 
as a parent involves: 
behaving toward a child in a manner consistent with being the child’s parent and per-
forming functions that are customarily performed by a parent, including fulfilling paren-
tal responsibilities toward the child, recognizing or holding out the child as the individ-
ual’s child, materially participating in the child’s upbringing, and residing with the child 
in the same household as a regular member of that household.   
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-115(4). 
 132.  Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(B). 
 133.  Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(C); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (“[T]he deceased individual is 
not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted 
reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the child.”). 
 134.  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(h)(1); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1), (5) (creat-
ing a presumption of paternity where a man is married to the child’s mother, and alternatively, where 
“for the first two years of the child’s life, [the man] resided in the same household with the child 
and openly held out the child as his own”).  The presumption is rebuttable by “clear and convincing 
evidence” that the husband did not function, nor intend to function, as a parent.  UNIF. PROB. CODE 
§ 2-120(h)(1). 
 135.  Id. § 2-120(h)(2).  This presumption is rebuttable by “clear and convincing evidence” that 
the deceased did not intend to function as a parent, nor intend to be treated as a parent.  Id. § 2-
120(h)(2).   
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2.  Gestational Surrogacy 
Under the UPA, whether a parent-child relationship is created through 
gestational surrogacy may depend on the terms of a judicially validated ges-
tational agreement.136  In the absence of a valid gestational agreement, par-
entage is determined based on the consideration of a variety of factors gen-
erally relied on to determine parent-child relationships.137 The provisions of 
the UPC, however, place no emphasis on a valid, enforceable agreement.138  
The UPC provides: 
(1) There is no parent-child relationship between a “gestational child”139 
and its “gestational carrier,”140 unless the gestational carrier’s parentage is 
established by a court order,141 or the gestational carrier is the child’s genetic 
mother and the child has no other parent-child relationship.142 
(2) If no court order exists, there is a parent-child relationship between 
a gestational child and its intended parent(s)143 if the parent “functioned as a 
parent of the child no later than two years after the child’s birth . . . .”144  
(3) “A parent-child relationship is conclusively established by a court 
order designating the parent or parents of a gestational child.”145 
                                                          
 136.  Id. §§ 801(a), 802(a), 809(a); see also id. § 801 (specifying the permissible terms and re-
quired parties of a gestational agreement); id. § 803 (specifying the findings a court must make 
before validating an agreement).  Where there is a “validated gestational agreement,” the parties to 
the agreement must also rely on the validating court to confirm parentage of the resulting child.  Id. 
§ 807(a)(1). 
 137.  See id. § 809(b) (stating that, where there is an unenforceable gestational agreement, par-
ent-child relationships will be determined under Article 2, which is generally titled, “Parent-Child 
Relationship”). 
 138.  See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-121(c)–(e). 
 139.  Id. § 2-121(a)(3) (“‘Gestational child’ means a child born to a gestational carrier under a 
gestational agreement.”).  
 140.  Id. § 2-121(a)(2) (“‘Gestational carrier’ means a woman who is not an intended parent who 
gives birth to a child under a gestational agreement.  The term is not limited to a woman who is the 
child’s genetic mother.”).   
 141.  Id. § 2-121(c)(1). 
 142.  Id. § 2-121(c)(2).   
 143.  “‘Intended parent’ means an individual who entered into a gestational agreement providing 
that the individual will be the parent of a child born to a gestational carrier by means of assisted 
reproduction.”  Id. § 2-121(a)(4). 
 144.  Id. § 2-121(d)(1).  The UPC also specifies when there is a parent-child relationship between 
a gestational child and a deceased intended parent.  See id. § 2-121(d)(2) (providing that a deceased 
intended parent is a parent of a gestational child when a co-intended parent or relative functions as 
a parent).  Additionally, see id. § 2-121(e), for provisions regarding a “Gestational Agreement after 
Death or Incapacity,” id. § 2-121(f), for provisions regarding a presumption of intent to parent, 
where there is a gestational agreement, after death or incapacity, id. § 2-121(g), for provisions re-
garding when that presumption is inapplicable, and id. § 2-121(h), for provisions regarding “[w]hen 
[a] [p]osthumously [c]onceived [g]estational [c]hild [is] [t]reated as in [g]estation.” 
 145.  Id. § 2-121(b). 
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By allowing intended parents to establish their parental status by playing 
the role of a parent, rather than requiring a court order or the absence of other 
parents as is the standard for gestational carriers, the UPC exudes a prefer-
ence for parent-child relationships between children and their intended par-
ents.146  Similarly, as discussed in Part II.C.3, courts have a tendency to re-
solve parentage issues by enforcing the parties’ original agreement and 
determining parentage in favor of intended parents.147  Thus, consent and in-
tent are constants in the task of determining the parentage of children of 
ARTs. 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the Court of Special Ap-
peals’ decision.  Emphasizing that Sieglein consented to artificial reproduc-
tion with his wife, the court held that Sieglein is the father of the child con-
ceived through IVF during his marriage, and further, that “artificial 
insemination” does encompass IVF.148  First, the court recognized its primary 
task: determining the meaning of “artificial insemination.”149  Second, the 
court conducted statutory interpretation of Maryland’s artificial insemination 
statute to discern its legislative purpose.150 
The court began its interpretation by asking whether the plain meaning 
of “artificial insemination” is clear and unambiguous.151  The court recited 
three definitions of “artificial insemination”: (1) “introduction of semen into 
the uterus or oviduct by other than natural means”152; (2) “the introduction of 
semen into the vagina by artificial means”153; and (3) introduction of semen 
into the vagina other than by coitus.”154  The court went on to note that 
Black’s Medical Dictionary recognizes “two forms of artificial insemina-
tion,” and that there are “multiple techniques for introducing the sperm into 
the woman.”155  Thus, the court concluded that “artificial insemination” has 
                                                          
 146.  Compare text accompanying supra notes 139–142 (addressing the parental status of in-
tended parents), with text accompanying supra notes 143–144 (addressing the parental status of 
gestational carriers). 
 147.  See supra Part II.C.3. 
 148.  Sieglein v. Schmidt, 447 Md. 647, 652, 670, 136 A.3d 751, 754, 765 (2016). 
 149.  Id. at 660, 136 A.3d at 759. 
 150.  Id. at 662, 136 A.3d at 760. 
 151.  Id. at 660, 136 A.3d at 759. 
 152.  Id. at 661, 136 A.3d at 760 (quoting Artificial insemination, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED (1961)). 
 153.  Id. (quoting Artificial insemination, BLACK’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1965)). 
 154.  Id. (quoting Artificial insemination, STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (28th ed. 2007)). 
 155.  Id.  Artificial insemination may be conducted using a woman’s husband’s sperm or donor 
sperm.  Id.  Additionally, artificial insemination may be conducted by placing sperm in a woman’s 
fallopian tube or uterus, or other locations within the woman’s body.  Id. at 661–62 n.13, 136 A.3d 
at 760 n.13 (citing DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 943 (32d ed. 2012)). 
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many meanings “generally related to artificial reproduction” and, therefore, 
that Maryland’s artificial insemination statute is ambiguous.156 
The court went on to resolve the ambiguity of “artificial insemination” 
by deciphering, from its legislative history, the legislative purpose of Mary-
land’s artificial insemination statute.157  The Commission to Review and Re-
vise the Testamentary Law of Maryland commented on the addition of Sec-
tion 1-206(b), revealing that “[i]t is derived from” Section 2-111(b) in the 
1967 draft of the Uniform Probate Code (“draft UPC”).158  A comment on 
Section 2-111(b) asserts that the provision intended to demonstrate the mod-
ern trend towards avoiding illegitimacy, as conception via donated sperm 
continued to raise concerns regarding the paternity of offspring.159  Thus, the 
court reasoned that the purpose of Maryland’s artificial insemination statute 
is to legitimize children conceived using donated sperm.160  The court inter-
preted the statute as applying to all ARTs (other than gestational surrogacy), 
and as protecting the legitimacy of children of ARTs involving donated 
sperm, regardless of what particular method is used.161  Therefore, given that 
Sieglein, as Schmidt’s husband, consented to the use of IVF, which the court 
held is encompassed by “artificial insemination,” the Court of Appeals found 
that Sieglein is the child’s father.162 
Judge Watts concurred, arguing that while Sieglein is the father of the 
child, the court should leave the extension of Maryland’s artificial insemina-
tion statute to the General Assembly.163  Judge Watts did not believe the court 
needed to conduct statutory interpretation of Section 1-206(b), because Sec-
tion 1-206(a) of Maryland’s Estates and Trusts Article applied.164  Section 1-
206(a) provides that “[a] child born or conceived during a marriage is pre-
sumed to be the legitimate child of both spouses.”165  Judge Watts posited 
that the purpose of Section 1-206(a) is to “extend a statutory presumption of 
legitimacy to children who are born or conceived during a marriage,” and 
that “no parent who voluntarily consented to the use of IVF . . . could over-
come the presumption of legitimacy that is established by [Section] 1-
206(a).”166  Therefore, because Sieglein consented to and participated in the 
                                                          
 156.  Sieglein, 447 Md. at 662, 136 A.3d at 760. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. (quoting COMM’N, SECOND REPORT, supra note 57, at 8). 
 159.  Id. at 663–64, 136 A.3d at 761–62 (quoting UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2–111 cmt. (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Third Working Draft, 1967)). 
 160.  Id. at 666, 136 A.3d at 763. 
 161.  Id. at 666–67, 136 A.3d at 763. 
 162.  Id. at 667, 670, 136 A.3d at 763, 765. 
 163.  Id. at 677–78, 136 A.3d at 769–70 (Watts, J., concurring). 
 164.  Id. at 678, 136 A.3d at 770. 
 165.  MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(a) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 166.  Sieglein, 447 Md. at 680–81, 136 A.3d at 771 (Watts, J., concurring). 
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IVF process, Judge Watts believed that Section 1-206(a) established his pa-
ternity.167 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Sieglein v. Schmidt, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Mar-
yland’s artificial insemination statute encompasses all ARTs, other than ges-
tational surrogacy.168  Part IV.A suggests that the court reached the correct 
conclusion in extending the application of the artificial insemination statute, 
despite improperly interpreting the term “artificial insemination.”169  Part 
IV.B.1 suggests that existing Maryland law surrounding ARTs is inade-
quate.170  Part IV.B.2 proposes and justifies a new statute for dealing with 
ARTs.171  Part IV.B.3 compares the proposed ART statute to Maryland’s cur-
rent artificial insemination statute by analyzing hypothetical cases.172 
A.  Although the Sieglein Court’s Reasoning Was Flawed, the Court 
Properly Concluded That Maryland’s Artificial Insemination 
Statute Encompasses Other ARTs 
The Sieglein court’s reasoning was flawed because it found ambiguity 
where there was none among the cited definitions of “artificial insemination,” 
which clearly describe one particular method of assisted reproduction.173  In-
stead, the court should have found the term “artificial insemination” to be 
ambiguous, within the context of the artificial insemination statute, because 
declaring that “artificial insemination” refers to only one ART would not ef-
fectuate the artificial insemination statute’s purpose—to minimize illegiti-
macy.174 
The term “artificial insemination” is ambiguous insofar as it refers to 
the multiple means by which semen is inserted into the woman during artifi-
cial insemination.175  It is clear, however, that artificial insemination involves 
the insertion of semen, rather than the insertion of an embryo or any other 
medical procedure.176  Yet, the Sieglein court found ambiguity in “artificial 
                                                          
 167.  Id. at 681, 136 A.3d at 771. 
 168.  Id. at 666–67, 136 A.3d at 763. 
 169.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 170.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 171.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 172.  See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 173.  See infra text accompanying notes 175–177 (arguing that the Sieglein court’s reasoning 
was flawed). 
 174.  See infra text accompanying notes 179–182 (explaining why it would be absurd for Mary-
land’s artificial insemination statute to apply to only artificial insemination). 
 175.  See supra note 155 (noting the different methods of artificial insemination). 
 176.  See supra text accompanying notes 152–154 for definitions of artificial insemination, none 
of which mention any procedure other than the introduction of semen into a woman. 
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insemination” because the technique can be performed in different ways.177  
Then, rather than determining which form of artificial insemination the term 
refers to, the court interpreted “artificial insemination” as referring to all 
ARTs.178  Thus, if nothing else, the Sieglein court took a circuitous route to 
reach the correct conclusion that the artificial insemination statute encom-
passes all ARTs. 
Instead, the Sieglein court should have reasoned that an inclusive inter-
pretation of “artificial insemination” is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
Maryland’s artificial insemination statute, which would have allowed it to 
then conclude that “artificial insemination” refers to all ARTs.179  The Gov-
ernor’s Commission to Review and Revise the Testamentary Law of Mary-
land (“the Commission”) declared that an artificial insemination statute was 
“desirable in view of the increased use of artificial insemination and the lack 
of any statute or case law on the subject in Maryland.”180  Thus, at the very 
least, one could conclude that the General Assembly of Maryland intended 
to protect the legitimacy of children born through artificial insemination.181  
It would be absurd, however, to conclude that the legislature wanted to pro-
tect children born through artificial insemination, but not children born 
through other ARTs.182 
Due to the Commission’s reference to the draft UPC,183 it is probable 
that the legislature had a broader purpose than to exclusively legitimize chil-
dren created through artificial insemination.  In its comment to the proposal 
of Maryland’s artificial insemination statute, the Commission acknowledged 
that the statute “is derived from” Section 2-111(b) of the draft UPC,184 and 
the comment to that section states, “[t]his section is designed to reflect the 
modern policy toward minimizing illegitimacy and its impact on inheritance 
rights . . . .”185  Because Section 2-111(b) of the draft UPC motivated the leg-
                                                          
 177.  See supra text accompanying notes 155–156 (explaining the Sieglein court’s reasoning for 
finding ambiguity in “artificial insemination”). 
 178.  See supra text accompanying note 161 (stating the Sieglein court’s final interpretation of 
Maryland’s artificial insemination statute). 
 179.  Recall that a court is allowed to consider statutory purpose in interpreting the plain meaning 
of statutory language.  See supra text accompanying note 74 (listing the considerations of statutory 
interpretation). 
 180.  COMM’N, SECOND REPORT, supra note 57, at 8. 
 181.  See id. 
 182.  Again, recall that in interpreting statutory language, a court must avoid prescribing a mean-
ing that will lead to absurdities.  See supra text accompanying note 71. 
 183.  UNIF. PROB. CODE (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Third 
Working Draft, 1967) [hereinafter UNIF. PROB. CODE, Third Working Draft]. 
 184.  COMM’N, SECOND REPORT, supra note 57, at 8. 
 185.  UNIF. PROB. CODE, Third Working Draft § 2-111 cmt.  
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islature, it is fair to conclude that the legislature endorsed the section’s pur-
pose, and adopted the same goal—the goal of “minimizing illegitimacy”186—
in drafting its own artificial insemination law.187  Protecting children created 
through artificial insemination, but not children created through any other 
ART, would do little to effectuate the legislature’s goal of minimizing ille-
gitimacy, because the most commonly used ART is IVF.188  Protecting chil-
dren created through artificial insemination, but not IVF, would not be an 
efficient way to minimize illegitimacy.  For that reason, provided the legis-
lature’s goal in creating Maryland’s artificial insemination statute was to 
minimize illegitimacy, it would be nonsensical to limit the statute’s applica-
tion to artificial insemination.  Therefore, the court could have deemed “arti-
ficial insemination” ambiguous because, in light of the artificial insemination 
statute’s purpose, it is unclear whether the term refers exclusively to artificial 
insemination or to all ARTs.189 
Although the Sieglein court did not base its finding of ambiguity on stat-
utory purpose, it properly interpreted “artificial insemination”—to effectuate 
the legislature’s intent—as including all ARTs (except surrogacy).190  Cov-
ering all ARTs under the artificial insemination statute is the most effective 
way to minimize illegitimacy.  Yet, as Judge Watts noted in her concurrence, 
it is possible that the legislature did not intend to include all ARTs in Mary-
land’s artificial insemination statute because the techniques “did not exist at 
the time [the statute] was enacted.”191  Considering her point, three alterna-
tives are possible: (1) the legislature intended not to protect children of ARTs 
other than artificial insemination; (2) the legislature intended to protect chil-
dren of all ARTs and used “artificial insemination” as an umbrella term; or 
(3) the legislature did not consider children of other ARTs at all.  It is unclear 
which was true when the legislature drafted Section 1-206(b).192  In any 
event, it is clear today that Maryland’s artificial insemination statute needs to 
be updated to accommodate medical advances in the realm of procreation.193 
                                                          
 186.  Id. 
 187.  See COMM’N, SECOND REPORT, supra note 57, at 8. 
 188.  Reproductive Health, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/infertility/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2017). 
 189.  See supra text accompanying notes 184–188. 
 190.  Sieglein v. Schmidt, 447 Md. 647, 666–67, 136 A.3d 751, 763 (2016). 
 191.  Id. at 681, 136 A.3d at 772 (Watts, J., concurring). 
 192.  See Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Reproductive 
Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 55, 69 (1994) (claiming 
that the application of artificial insemination statutes “to other assisted conception procedures is 
uncertain,” but “[t]here is a strong case for construing ‘artificial insemination,’ . . . as encompassing 
other methods of assisted conception,” because of the similarities between artificial insemination 
and other ARTs). 
 193.  See Sieglein, 447 Md. at 678, 136 A.3d at 770 (recognizing a possibility that Maryland’s 
artificial insemination statute needs to be amended in order to accommodate modern medicine). 
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B.  Maryland’s Artificial Insemination Statute Should Be Extended to 
Protect Children Born Through Any ART 
1.  Existing Maryland Parentage Statutes Fall Short of Adequately 
Answering Questions Presented in ART Cases 
Maryland needs a broader statute that will work to prevent the illegiti-
macy of children created through any ART.194  One might argue that a statute 
specifically addressing ARTs is unnecessary because other paternity statutes 
can effectively prevent illegitimacy, namely, Estates and Trusts Article Sec-
tions 1-206(a)195 and 1-208(b),196 or Family Law Article Sections 5-
1027(c)(1),197 5-1028(d)(1)198 and 5-1029(f)(4).199  For example, Judge Watts 
suggested that Section 1-206(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article should have 
been used to resolve the paternity issue in Sieglein v. Schmidt, arguing that, 
under that statute, a husband is presumed to be the father of a child conceived 
during marriage.200  Yet, Judge Watts’s argument falls short because genetic 
testing can be used to rebut a presumption of paternity.201  Thus, applying 1-
206(a) in cases where ARTs are used, such as in Sieglein where the child was 
not genetically related to the husband or the wife, is problematic because 
someone like Schmidt, who denies parentage, could rebut the presumption of 
paternity by showing that he and the child are not genetically related.202  On 
a related note, using genetic testing to establish parentage in ARTs cases, as 
permitted by Family Law Article Section 5-1029(f)(4), is insufficient be-
cause, in many cases, the individual seeking parentage will not be genetically 
related to the child.203  Ultimately, the General Assembly created Estates and 
Trusts Article Section 1-206(b) because of “the lack of any statute . . . on the 
subject in Maryland,” suggesting that other paternity statutes were never 
meant to apply to ARTs cases.204  Therefore, there is an unmet “need for the 
                                                          
 194.  See Elliott L. Biskind, Legitimacy of Children Born by Artificial Insemination, 5 J. FAM. 
L. 39, 43 (1965) (recognizing “that it is necessary to remove from children the stigma of illegiti-
macy”). 
 195.  MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(a) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 196.  Id. § 1-208(b).  
 197.  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1027(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 198.  Id. § 5-1028(d)(1). 
 199.  Id. § 5-1029(f)(4). 
 200.  See supra text accompanying notes 164–167. 
 201.  Miles v. Stovall, 132 Md. App. 71, 82–83, 750 A.2d 729, 736 (2000). 
 202.  See Sieglein v. Schmidt, 224 Md. App. 222, 227, 230, 120 A.3d 790, 793, 795 (2015), 
aff’d, 447 Md. 647, 136 A.3d 751 (2016).  
 203.  See, e.g., id. at 229, 120 A.3d at 794–95. 
 204.  COMM’N, SECOND REPORT, supra note 57, at 8; see Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood By 
Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS 
L.J. 597, 599 (2002) (“[L]egislatures addressing assisted reproduction have fashioned unique stat-
utes to resolve these issues, suggesting that well-established parentage principles do not adequately 
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law to recognize [families created through ARTs, which] are not accounted 
for by the parentage rules of the past.”205 
2.  Proposed ART Statute 
Maryland’s artificial insemination statute should be replaced by an ART 
statute modeled off of the current statute:  
 A child conceived by an assisted reproductive technology is the 
child of an individual, or individuals—not to exceed two persons—
who consented to artificial reproduction with intent to parent the 
child.206 
The proposed ART statute maintains the consent element of the artificial 
insemination statute because consent has been “crucial” to establishing par-
entage,207 and is seemingly equally important to determining parentage where 
other ARTs are used to create children.208  Nevertheless, the proposed statute 
differs from Maryland’s artificial insemination statute in three ways: (1) it 
refers to ARTs rather than artificial insemination; (2) it does not make par-
entage dependent on marital status; and (3) it makes intent to parent a prereq-
uisite for parental status.209 
The first change proposed in the ART statute is to mention “assisted 
reproductive technology,” rather than “artificial insemination,” because as 
articulated throughout this Note, a major failing of current statutes is their 
mention of only artificial insemination.210 
The second change proposed in the ART statute is to abandon marriage 
as a determinant of legitimacy because it “run[s] afoul of sound social pol-
icy.”211  Marriage-based restrictions on families created through ARTs are 
problematic for the following four reasons.  First, heterosexual intercourse 
                                                          
account for the policy ramifications of the use of these techniques.”); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 75 (noting that statutes should be interpreted so that no portion is superfluous). 
 205.  Storrow, supra note 204, at 601. 
 206.  This model ART statute was drafted by the author.  Compare MD. CODE ANN., EST. & 
TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 207.  Michael J. Higdon, Fatherhood by Conscription: Nonconsensual Insemination and the 
Duty of Child Support, 46 GA. L. REV. 407, 439 (2012); see supra text accompanying notes 146–
147 (recognizing the UPC and judicial reliance on intent). 
 208.  See, e.g., Sieglein, 447 Md. at 666, 136 A.3d at 763 (emphasizing consent in the determi-
nation of paternity where a child was created using IVF).  Just as with artificial insemination stat-
utes, consent should be demonstrable through writing or orally, or “under contract theories or equi-
table principles.”  Storrow, supra note 204, at 624; see also supra text accompanying notes 130–
133 (listing different ways to establish consent). 
 209.  See EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b). 
 210.  McAllister, supra note 192, at 100–01. 
 211.  Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case Against 
Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305, 
318 (2006). 
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has been thought of as the purpose of marriage, but sexual intercourse is 
clearly beyond the scope of ARTs.212  Because ARTs do not involve sexual 
intercourse, marriage-based restrictions on procreation through ARTs “can-
not be justified as advancing marriage’s role in the regulation of human sex-
ual relations.”213  Second, it has been suggested that marriage-based re-
strictions may promote legitimacy due to marriage-based presumptions of 
paternity.214  Yet, the UPA seeks to treat marital and non-marital children 
equally, making marriage-based restrictions counterproductive, and such re-
strictions are harmful to non-marital children.215  Third, while it is true that 
marriage-based restrictions are an efficient means for guaranteeing two-par-
ent support, there is a trend toward measuring the guarantee of support by 
commitment rather than marriage; and marriage is not a prerequisite for a 
commitment to parenting.216  Fourth, it could be that marriage-based re-
strictions are a benefit of marriage, meant to encourage the institution of mar-
riage217; but “married couples are [rarely] made the sole beneficiaries of 
newly created privileges,” and it is doubtful that marriage-based restrictions 
actually promote marriage.218  Additionally, consistent with the American 
commitment to equal treatment, the American practice is to avoid “condi-
tion[ing] procreative liberty upon marital status.”219  Therefore, application 
of the ART statute should not be limited to married couples.220 
The final change proposed in the ART statute is to base the establish-
ment of parentage on intent, as opposed to genetics or gestation.221  Where a 
                                                          
 212.  Id. at 319; see also Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based 
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 337 (1990) (noting the 
“separation of sexual behavior from procreative behavior” in ARTs). 
 213.  Storrow, supra note 211, at 319–20. 
 214.  Id. at 320; see also Hannah Alsgaard, Decoupling Marriage & Procreation: A Feminist 
Argument for Same-Sex Marriage, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 307, 319 (2012) (“By writ-
ing these paternity laws, legislatures have extended the marital presumption of paternity to children 
who were knowingly conceived through technology with non-marital genetic material.”). 
 215.  Storrow, supra note 211, at 321; Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, 
Gender, and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1192 (2010). 
 216.  Storrow, supra note 211, at 321, 323; see also Shultz, supra note 212, at 332 (suggesting 
that intent should determine parentage because of the magnitude of the commitment necessary to 
parenting). 
 217.  Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in 
the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 248 (2006) (“[T]he presumption of legitimacy 
serves to establish the unitary family or the marital family as the normative family.”).  
 218.  Storrow, supra note 211, at 324, 326; see also Shultz, supra note 212, at 326 (claiming that 
non-traditional family forms are gaining “recognition and tolerance”). 
 219.  Storrow, supra note 211, at 327, 331; Appleton, supra note 217, at 243; see also supra note 
42 (demonstrating the progression towards embracing the equal treatment of legitimate and illegit-
imate children). 
 220.  See supra text accompanying notes 212–219.   
 221.  See Shultz, supra note 212, at 323 (asserting that intent should be the basis of parentage 
where ARTs are involved). 
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child is created through an ART, there are eight potential parents: “the egg 
donor, the sperm donor, their spouses, the surrogate and her husband, and the 
intending mother and father.”222  In ARTs, a genetic donor “plays the passive 
role of providing the seed from which the child will develop,” which is in-
sufficient for the establishment of parentage.223  In fact, the genetic tie be-
tween a donor and child is no greater than the genetic tie between a child and 
his or her sibling.224  Thus, if genetics were to be the basis of parentage, sib-
lings and donors would have equal claims to parental status, which lawmak-
ers would likely deem unacceptable.225  Additionally, most sperm and egg 
donors have given up their rights to their genetic material and cannot claim a 
property right in parentage.226  Alternatively, some argue that gestation 
should determine parentage due to the bond created between a host and child, 
and the harm that could result from a child not developing that sort of emo-
tional tie.227  A bond between a host and child, however, is not necessary for 
a child to receive optimal “love and nurtur[ing],” and it is not clear that only 
natural parents develop such bonds with children.228  Some further argue that 
gestation should determine parentage because of “the effects . . . of relin-
quishing the child” on the host, but this “must be weighed against a similar 
harm to the intended parents in the event that the surrogate does not turn over 
the child.”229  Additionally, there is an argument that gestation should deter-
mine parentage because of the amount of “work” done by a gestational host; 
yet a host gives up her ability to make such a claim when she agrees to carry 
a child, understanding that she will relinquish the child after gestation.230  
Thus, the arguments in favor of genetics and gestation as indicators of par-
entage are unconvincing. 
Professor Hill makes three arguments for supporting intention as the ba-
sis of parentage: (1) “The ‘But For’-Causation Argument”; (2) “The Contract 
Argument”; and (3) “The Avoidance-of-Uncertainty Argument.”231  The 
                                                          
 222.  Storrow, supra note 204, at 602. 
 223.  John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the 
Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 391 (1991); Appleton, supra note 217, at 270 
(noting that “the legal significance of genetic connection seems to have been often overstated”); see 
also supra note 129 (noting the negligible role of donating genetic materials to ART processes).  
 224.  Hill, supra note 223, at 391. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. at 391–92.  Further, “children are not property.”  Id.  
 227.  Id. at 394, 401. 
 228.  See id. at 400, 402 (“[S]tudies of attachment between adoptive mothers and children report 
no difference in the quality of attachment between adoptive and natural parent-child relationships.”).  
 229.  Id. at 405, 407.  
 230.  Id. at 407–08 (“Even assuming she could have property rights in the child, the surrogate 
has no more of a claim to the ‘property’ by virtue of this argument than a builder has in a house 
constructed for another.”); see also Shultz, supra note 212, at 331 (describing the work done by a 
gestational host). 
 231.  Hill, supra note 223, at 414–17. 
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“‘But For’ Causation” argument suggests that intent should determine par-
entage because the intended parents are the ones who brought about the cre-
ation of the child.232  This argument lies on the premise that intent to have a 
child, rather than any biological linkage, is the essence of parenthood.233  
Some might counter that other participants are necessary in the creation of 
the child and are also but-for causes, but the “intended parents are the first 
cause” and the other participants are not essential—they can be replaced with 
other persons willing to play their roles.234  The “Contract” argument suggests 
that intent should determine parentage due to the promise of other partici-
pants “to refrain from claiming parental rights.”235  Enforcement of these 
promises is in the interest of children of ARTs, because intended parents need 
to be able to rely on such promises in order to fully prepare to be good par-
ents.236  Finally, the “Avoidance-of-Uncertainty” argument suggests that in-
tent should determine parentage at the time of conception to avoid an adverse 
impact on all parties237; “[p]ermitting challenges to the parental status of the 
intended parents virtually ensures that the child will grow up in the functional 
equivalent of a broken home.”238  For these reasons, and in accord with the 
UPA, UPC, and jurisprudence related to parentage and ARTs, the proposed 
ART statute focuses on intent as the basis for parentage. 
Because the proposed ART statute refers to ARTs in general, applies to 
married and unmarried persons, and bases parental status on intent rather than 
the assumption that a woman conceives only with her husband, the proposed 
statute is wider reaching and less presumptive than Maryland’s artificial in-
semination statute, making it a more effective law.239 
                                                          
 232.  Id. at 414; see also Joslin, supra note 215, at 1182 (“[I]f one is truly concerned with the 
well-being of children, then one should support parentage rules that ensure that all children are 
provided with adequate financial protections by and through the people who intentionally brought 
them into the world.”). 
 233.  Hill, supra note 223, at 414. 
 234.  Id. at 415; Alsgaard, supra note 214, at 320 n.90. 
 235.  Hill, supra note 223, at 415. 
 236.  Id. at 416; see also Joslin, supra note 215, at 1223 (positing that another benefit of intent-
based parentage is that it prevents the child from having to litigate to enjoy the benefits of legal 
familial ties). 
 237.  Hill, supra note 223, at 417 (“In cases where litigation over parental rights takes years, the 
child may grow up with uncertainty regarding the identity of her parents.”); Shultz, supra note 212, 
at 324. 
 238.  Hill, supra note 223, at 417. 
 239.  See infra text accompanying notes 243–267 (comparing the current statute to the proposed 
ART statute). 
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3.  Comparison of the Proposed ART Statute and Maryland’s 
Artificial Insemination Statute 
Legal philosopher Lon Fuller proposed eight elements of good law, 
which have been characterized as: “[g]enerality”; “[n]otice or publicity”; 
“[p]rospectivity” (or non-retroactivity); “[c]larity”; “[n]on-contradictori-
ness”; “[c]onformability”; “[s]tability”; and “[c]ongruence.”240  The pro-
posed ART statute would be a better law, fulfilling more of those eight ele-
ments, than Maryland’s artificial insemination statute.  To demonstrate this, 
what follows is a comparison of the proposed ART statute and the current 
artificial insemination statute, as applied to nine hypothetical cases.  After 
all, “[w]hen it comes to advocating for a change in the law, storytelling can 
be an extremely powerful tool.”241  The following hypothetical cases are 
based on cases presented by Emily McAllister in Defining the Parent-Child 
Relationship in an Age of Reproductive Technology: Implications for Inher-
itance, which she used to illustrate the utility of a proposed statute that re-
formed deficiencies in a uniform act encompassing inheritance and parentage 
law related to children of ARTs.242 
a.  Case 1 
X conceives through IVF, using an egg and semen from anonymous do-
nors, with X’s spouse’s consent and intent to parent.243 
This is the scenario presented in Sieglein v. Schmidt.244  Given the Court 
of Appeal’s holding in Sieglein—that Maryland’s current statute applies to 
all ARTs other than surrogacy—X and her spouse would be the parents of the 
resulting child as long as her spouse is a man.245  Under the proposed ART 
statute, both X and her spouse would be the resulting child’s parents, regard-
less of the spouse’s sex, because they intended to parent the child. 
                                                          
 240.  Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 784–85 (1989); 
see also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38–39 (1964). 
 241.  Higdon, supra note 207, at 409. 
 242.  McAllister, supra note 192, at 101, 103. 
 243.  Id. at 103. 
 244.  See supra text accompanying note 20 (providing the facts of Sieglein). 
 245.  See Sieglein v. Schmidt, 447 Md. 647, 666–67, 136 A.3d 751, 763 (2016) (interpreting the 
current statute as extending the presumption of paternity to children of ARTs other than surrogacy, 
conceived with a husband’s consent).  Given that women must be able to prove maternity using the 
same means through which men are able to prove paternity, it might be that the artificial insemina-
tion statute applies to all married couples—heterosexual and homosexual.  In re Roberto d.B., 399 
Md. 267, 283, 923 A.2d 115, 124 (2007). 
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b.  Case 2 
X conceives through IVF, using an egg and semen from anonymous do-
nors, without X’s spouse’s consent or intent to parent.246 
Under both the current statute and the proposed ART statute, X, but not 
her spouse, would be the resulting child’s parent, because X’s spouse did not 
consent to the ART, as required by the current and proposed ART statutes.247 
c.  Case 3 
X conceives through IVF, using an egg and semen from anonymous do-
nors, with X’s non-spousal partner’s consent and intent to parent.248 
The current statute would be inapplicable because X and her partner are 
not married.249  Under the proposed ART statute, however, the result is the 
same as in case 1250; X and her partner would be the parents of the resulting 
child, because the determining factor under the proposed ART statute is con-
sent and marital status is irrelevant. 
d.  Case 4 
X conceives through IVF, using an egg and semen from anonymous do-
nors, without X’s non-spousal partner’s consent or intent to parent.251 
Here, the result would be the same as in case 2, although the current 
statute would not apply because X is not married to her partner.252  Still, under 
the proposed ART statute, X’s partner is not the resulting child’s parent be-
cause they did not consent to the reproductive procedure. 
e.  Case 5 
X conceives through IVF, using a donor egg and a friend’s semen.  Alt-
hough the friend consented to the use of his semen, he did not agree to act as 
a parent.253 
In this case, the current statute would not apply because X is unmar-
ried.254  Under the proposed ART statute, X, but not her friend, would be a 
parent of the resulting child, because the friend did not consent to the repro-
ductive procedure with the intent to parent. 
                                                          
 246.  McAllister, supra note 192, at 104. 
 247.  See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 248.  McAllister, supra note 192, at 105. 
 249.  See EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b). 
 250.  See supra Part IV.B.3.a. 
 251.  McAllister, supra note 192, at 105. 
 252.  See EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b); supra Part IV.B.3.b.   
 253.  McAllister, supra note 192, at 106. 
 254.  See EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b). 
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f.  Case 6 
X conceives through IVF, using a friend’s semen.  The friend consented 
to the use of his semen and agreed to act as a parent.255 
Again, the current statute would be inapplicable because X is unmar-
ried.256  Under the proposed ART statute, X and her friend would be parents 
of the resulting child, because the friend consented to the reproductive pro-
cedure with intent to parent. 
g.  Case 7 
X conceives through IVF, using an egg and semen from anonymous do-
nors, pursuant to a gestational surrogacy agreement whereby X is to relin-
quish the child to Y and Z, or alternatively to Y, who intend to parent.257 
The current statute would not apply in this case because the Sieglein 
court did not extend the reach of the statute to surrogacy.258  Under the pro-
posed ART statute, Y and Z, or Y alone, would be the resulting child’s parents 
because, although X, Y, and Z, all consented to participate in artificial repro-
duction, Y and Z, not X, intended to parent the child. 
h. Case 8 
X conceives through IVF, using her own egg and semen from an anon-
ymous donor, pursuant to a surrogacy agreement whereby X is to relinquish 
the child to Y and Z, or alternatively to Y, who intend to parent.259 
The parentage in this case would be the same as in Case 7 because the 
proposed ART statute emphasizes intent, not genetic relation or gestation.260 
i.  Case 9 
X conceives through IVF, using her spouse’s egg and sperm from an 
anonymous donor, with the consent of her same-sex spouse, who intends to 
parent.261 
Since this case involves a same-sex couple, the current statute might not 
apply because it appears to be written to encompass heterosexual, married 
couples.262  If, however, X and her partner were married and the current stat-
ute did apply, X and her partner would be the resulting child’s parents because 
                                                          
 255.  McAllister, supra note 192, at 107. 
 256.  See EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b). 
 257.  McAllister, supra note 192, at 107. 
 258.  See Sieglein v. Schmidt, 447 Md. 647, 666–67, 136 A.3d 751, 763 (2016). 
 259.  McAllister, supra note 192, at 107. 
 260.  See supra Part IV.B.3.g. 
 261.  McAllister, supra note 192, at 109. 
 262.  See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (LexisNexis 2011). 
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X’s partner consented to the artificial reproduction.263  Under the proposed 
ART statute, there would be no room to doubt whether X and her partner were 
the resulting child’s parents because the requisite consent is present, and sex-
uality and marital status are irrelevant under the proposed ART statute. 
*     *     * 
In at least six of the nine cases presented above—cases 3 through 8—
Maryland’s current statute would be inapplicable due to its consideration of 
only married couples and exclusion of surrogacy, whereas the proposed ART 
statute would be applicable in all nine cases.264  Thus, considering Fuller’s 
elements of good law, the proposed ART statute is more effective than the 
current statute because it is more general—more cases “can be seen to fall 
under or lie within” the proposed ART statute than the current statute.265  Fur-
ther, prior to the holding in Sieglein v. Schmidt, Maryland’s current statute 
failed Fuller’s notice and prospectivity elements because the statute was not 
known to apply to ARTs other than artificial insemination.266  There was an 
issue with notice, because it was unclear to whom the current statute would 
apply.  Additionally, there was a problem with prospectivity, because the cur-
rent statute did not necessarily exist as a rule applying to all ARTs prior to 
the question of such application coming before the court.267  Therefore, the 
proposed ART statute is more effective than Maryland’s current statute be-
cause it is broader, provides better notice of applicability to the public, and is 
not retroactive. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Sieglein v. Schmidt, the Court of Appeals of Maryland improperly 
found ambiguity in the term “artificial insemination,” but properly concluded 
that Maryland’s artificial insemination statute applies to all ARTs.268  Still, 
as written, Maryland’s artificial insemination statute leaves some children of 
ARTs unprotected.269  The goal is to maximize legitimacy, but the current 
law falls short of covering all cases where ARTs are used, thereby leaving 
                                                          
 263.  See id. 
 264.  See supra Part IV.B.3.a–i (comparing the current statute and the proposed ART statute 
through hypothetical cases). 
 265.  See Radin, supra note 240, at 785 (describing generality). 
 266.  See id. (explaining notice as requiring that “[t]hose who are expecting to obey the rules 
must be able to find out what the rules are,” and prospectivity as requiting that “rules must exist 
prior in time to the actions being judged by them”); supra text accompanying note 33 (asserting that 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland heard Sieglein v. Schmidt to determine the reach of the current 
statute). 
 267.  See Radin, supra note 240, at 785 (describing notice and prospectivity). 
 268.  See supra Part III. 
 269.  See supra Part IV.B.3. 
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room for illegitimacy.270  The General Assembly of Maryland should amend 
Maryland’s artificial insemination statute, to include all ARTS and individu-
als who procreate, and ensure that no child of ART experiences illegiti-
macy.271 
                                                          
 270.  See supra text accompanying note 187; Part IV.B.3. 
 271.  See supra Part IV.B.1–2. 
